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Chapter 20
TheRegulation of Digital Trade in the TPP:
Trade Rules for the Digital Age
Henry Gao
Abstract With the rapid development of the internet, electronic commerce is also
gaining importance in international trade. However, the rules governing digital
trade is still largely lacking. While WTO Members have been discussing the reg-
ulation of electronic commerce since the last century, little progress has been made.
Instead, most of the progresses are made in various free trade agreements, espe-
cially those sponsored by the United States. This article starts with a review of the
efforts to regulate e-commerce in the WTO, as well as what the pre-TPP US FTAs
have achieved so far, followed by a critical appraisal of the achievements and
shortcomings of the e-commerce chapter in the TPP. It is hoped that, by reviewing
the evolution of the regulation of e-commerce from the WTO to the TPP, we can
learn some lessons on how the rules are being shaped, as well as how it might
evolve in the future.
Keywords Electronic commerce  Digital trade  Trade in services
GATS  TPP  WTO  Free trade agreements
In September 2008, the USTR formally announced the launch of US negotiations to
join the Trans-Paciﬁc Strategic Economic Partnership, a comprehensive Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) concluded by Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand and
Singapore.1 With the US on board, several other countries also queued up for the
agreement, which quickly snowballed from one of the smallest FTAs into the
biggest trade deal the world has ever seen.
After seven years of negotiations, in October 2015, the trade ministers of the
twelve countries ﬁnally announced the successful conclusion of the negotiations for
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the new agreement, which has been renamed as the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership
Agreement.2 As the ﬁrst and only trade agreement ever launched and successfully
negotiated by the Obama Administration, the TPP provides important insights into
the future directions of the US trade policy. This is the case not only for traditional
trade issues such as tariff and non-tariff barriers, but also for cutting-egg issues
which would make the TPP a truly “21st century” trade agreement.
One prominent example of the new issues is the regulation of digital trade or
e-commerce, an issue which the WTO Members have been toying with since the last
century but yet to make much progress. In this article, I will start with a review of the
efforts to regulate e-commerce in theWTO, as well as what the pre-TPPUS FTAs have
achieved so far, followed by a critical appraisal of the achievements and shortcomings
of the e-commerce chapter in the TPP. It is hoped that, by reviewing the evolution of
the regulation of e-commerce from theWTO to the TPP, we can learn some lessons on
how the rules are being shaped, as well as how it might evolve in the future.
1 The WTO
1.1 Overview
In the WTO, the ﬁrst effort to regulate e-commerce was made at the 2nd Ministerial
Conference in May 1998, where the Members adopted the Declaration on Global
Electronic Commerce. The Declaration recognized the “new opportunities for
trade”, and directed the General Council to “establish a comprehensive work pro-
gramme to examine all trade-related issues relating to global electronic commerce,
including those issues identiﬁed by Members.”
In the Declaration, the Members also agreed to “continue their current practice of
not imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions”. This moratorium on
customs cuties has been extended several times, latest in Nairobi until 2017.
At the same time, the moratorium also left a few questions unanswered. First of
all, it is unclear as to whether the term “electronic transmissions” refers only to the
medium of e-commerce, or to the content of the transmission as well, i.e., the
underlying product or service being transmitted. Second, if it refers to the medium
of transmission only, does this mean that other digital products which are supplied
via traditional medium, such as books, music or videos on CDs could be subject to
customs duties? Third, does the prohibition applies only to customs duties, or to
other fees or charges imposed on the digital products? Fourth, does the moratorium
applies only to imports, or to exports as well?
Pursuant to the Declaration, the General Council adopted the Work Programme
on Electronic Commerce in September 1998. Under the Work Program, “electronic
2Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership Ministers’ Statement, Oct 2015, available at <https://ustr.gov/about-us/
policy-ofﬁces/press-ofﬁce/press-releases/2015/october/trans-paciﬁc-partnership-ministers>
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commerce” is broadly deﬁned to cover “the production, distribution, marketing,
sale or delivery of goods and services by electronic means”. Moreover, the Work
Program also includes under its scope “issues relating to the development of the
infrastructure for electronic commerce.”
As e-commerce cuts across many different areas, the Work Program divides up
the work among different WTO bodies as follows:
The Council for Trade in Services shall examine the treatment of electronic com-
merce in the GATS legal framework, which include horizontal issues such as the
scope and classiﬁcation of sectors and access to and use of public telecommuni-
cations transport networks and services, the application of both unconditional
obligations such as MFN and transparency and conditional obligations like market
access, national treatment and domestic regulation, standards, and recognition, as
well as measures taken for the protection of privacy and public morals, the pre-
vention of fraud and competition disciplines;
The Council for Trade in Goods shall examine aspects of electronic commerce
relevant to the provisions of GATT 1994, the multilateral trade agreements covered
under Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, and the approved work programme,
which include not only tariff-related issues such as classiﬁcation, customs duties
and market access, but also non-tariff issues such as rules of origin, customs val-
uation, import licensing and standards;
The Council for TRIPS shall examine the intellectual property issues arising in
connection with electronic commerce, which include issues such as the protection
and enforcement of copyright and trademarks, and new technologies and access to
technology;
The Committee on Trade and Development shall examine and report on the
development implications of electronic commerce, taking into account the eco-
nomic, ﬁnancial and development needs of developing countries.
These bodies shall report their progress to the General Council on a regular
basis. In addition, the General Council is also responsible for the review of any
cross-cutting trade-related and all aspects of the work programme concerning the
imposition of customs duties on electronic transmission. In carrying out its work,
these bodies shall also take into account the work of other intergovernmental
organizations as well as relevant non-governmental organizations.
Since then, the Members have conducted many discussions on e-commerce in
the various bodies. However, due to the slow progress in the DDA in general, the
Members have not been able to reach any decision on the substantive disciplines on
e-commerce notwithstanding the ambitious agenda foreseen in the Work Program.3
In the absence of new disciplines, the main obligations on the regulation of
e-commerce under the existing WTO legal framework can be found in the GATS
3Work Programme on Electronic Commerce Dedicated Discussions Under the Auspices of the
General Council Report to the 21 November 2013 meeting of the General Council, WT/GC/W/
676, 11 November 2013.
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Telecom Annex, which sets out the basic rights of access to and use of public
telecommunications transport networks and services by service suppliers, including
e-commerce suppliers. Under para 5.a., the general principle is that such service
suppliers shall be accorded access to and use of public telecommunications trans-
port networks and services on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and con-
ditions. This principle is further elaborated in the following sub-paras, which try to
strike a delicate balance between the users’ rights (para 5 lit. b and c) and the
regulators’ rights (para 5 lit. E–g).4
Beyond the rules in the Telecom Annex, the issues involved in the regulation of
e-commerce in the WTO fall into the following three main areas.
The ﬁrst is the classiﬁcation issue. As we stated earlier, Internet activities can be
classiﬁed as goods or services. The distinction is not merely theoretical but has
profound practical implications. If they are treated as goods, they could be subject
ﬁrst and foremost to customs duties, as well as MFN, national treatment, and a whole
set of non-tariff disciplines such as those on rules of origin, import licensing, customs
valuation etc. On the other hand, if they are treated as services, the Members will not
be able to regulate them through border measures such as tariffs, but they would have
signiﬁcant leeway in imposing domestic regulations on e-commerce.
While some activities such as the online delivery of books and audio-visual
products could arguably be classiﬁed as goods according to the
technology-neutrality principle, most activities carried through the Internet share
more similarities with services trade. For example, many e-commerce activities are
intangible and non-storable like services. Similarly, many e-commerce activities are
produced with the joint input from both the suppliers and consumers, thus are
tailor-made according to the needs of speciﬁc consumers like other services.
As it is impossible to provide a comprehensive discussion of both goods and
services in such a short paper, we shall mainly focus on the services issues here.
Unlike the GATT, which applies a uniform set of rules to most products, the GATS
adopts a different regulatory approach. According to the “positive listing” approach,
WTO Members only assume obligations for sectors that they have included in their
schedule of speciﬁc commitments. Thus, we have to further determine which sector
or sub-sector e-commerce activities fall under and check the respective schedules to
see if it is covered.
Second, even for services covered in its schedule, a WTO Member can choose
among different levels of liberalization by inscribing commitments ranging from
“none” (which means “no limitation” or “fully liberalized”) to “unbound” (which
means “no commitment”) in the market access and national treatment columns.
Thus, we have to determine the appropriate obligations for e-commerce activities.
Third, for legitimate policy reasons,WTOMembersmight need to deviate from their
normal obligations. This is possible under both the GATT and GATS by citing the
4Henry Gao, ‘Commentary on Telecommunication Services’, in Rüdiger Wolfrum and
Peter-Tobias Stoll (eds), Max Planck Commentaries On World Trade Law, Volume VI: “WTO—
Trade In Services”, (Brill (Martinus Nijhoff) Publishers, 2008) paras 41–54.
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“General Exceptions” clauses. However, as illustrated by the WTO cases, the preferred
exceptions under each agreement have been rather different. Under the GATT, the most
commonly cited exceptions are the ones to protect public health and environment. In
contrast, the favorite clause under the GATS has been the public morals exception.
Due to its unique nature, e-commerce activities pose special challenges to the
GATS regulatory framework on all three issues. In the following sections, I will
discuss the regulatory difﬁculties in each of these areas and, where appropriate,
make some policy suggestions on how to address these problems.5
1.2 How Should e-commerce Be Classiﬁed?
Under the GATS, services are classiﬁed according to the Services Sectoral
Classiﬁcation List, which classiﬁes all services into 12 sectors and 160 sub-sectors.
While this system does a good job in classifying most other services sectors, it has
not been so useful in classifying e-commerce activities. To start with, the
Classiﬁcation List is outdated as it is based on the United Nations Provisional
Central Product Classiﬁcation (CPCprov). The CPCprov was published in 1990,
when the Internet was still in its infancy and many e-commerce activities, such as
search engines, did not even exist. It doesn’t provide direct reference to many
e-commerce activities that are common today. Instead, they are often scattered
across many sectors. For example, search engine services can arguably be classiﬁed
under either telecommunication services or computer and related services.
Paradoxically, some of the classiﬁcations under the Services Sectoral Classiﬁcation
List also overlap with each other. For example, under the List, online info pro-
cessing and data processing share the same code under CPCprov, but are grouped
under telecommunication services and computer services respectively.
To better capture the reality of e-commerce activities, the current classiﬁcation
system needs to be reviewed and revamped in a systematic manner. Depending on
the nature of the services, different approaches should be taken. On the one hand,
for e-commerce activities which have been supplied through traditional channels
before the advent of the Internet, they should be grouped under the original sector
as per the technology-neutrality principle, unless of course their nature have been
changed by the online delivery. Thus, online banking services shall be classiﬁed
under banking services, and online universities shall be classiﬁed under educational
services, etc. On the other hand, the classiﬁcation of services that only emerged
with the birth of Internet is more tricky. As the latest version of the CPC includes
many such services, it is tempting to simply replace the reference to the CPCprov
codes in the Services Sectoral Classiﬁcation List with the corresponding codes in
5Part of the discussions below are based on Henry Gao, ‘Can WTO Law Keep Up with the
Internet?’ Proceedings of the 104th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law
(American Society of International Law, 2016).
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the new version. However, this approach is undesirable for the following reasons.
First, as the Services Sectoral Classiﬁcation List is not mandatory, not every WTO
Member uses it or includes explicit reference to the CPC codes in its schedule;
Second, even for those that do use the CPC, the schedule cannot be simply updated
with the new CPC versions. This is because the CPC often re-shuffles the code
numbers around when the versions are updated, thus the same code numbers under
different versions might refer to entirely different services. Third, as cases like U.S.-
Gambling have shown, it has been a challenge for WTO Members to fully
understand even their own commitments. Thus, they will not accept a compre-
hensive update of the schedules without careful scrutiny.
Because of these difﬁculties, even just an update of the schedules based on the
latest CPC version probably cannot be achieved without major negotiation efforts.
In addition, as many e-commerce activities are closely linked together, it is prob-
ably better to take a cluster approach in the review and deal with them together.
1.3 Which Obligations Should Apply?
Other than the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle, most obligations under the
GATS only applies when a Member schedules relevant commitments. For each
sector that a Member includes in its schedule, the Member may choose how much
market access or national treatment that it is willing to offer. Moreover, such
scheduled commitments are also subject to sector or mode-speciﬁc limitations.
For e-commerce activities, such regulatory framework creates the following
problems:
First is ambiguity in sectoral coverage. Even though a Member may choose
which sectors to include in its schedule, ambiguities could still arise due to
imperfections in the classiﬁcation system. A good example in this regard is the U.
S.-Gambling case. In this case, the United States included in its schedule a
sub-sector entitled “Other Recreational Services (except sporting)”. While the
United States argued that “sporting” includes gambling services, the WTO Panel
disagreed and ruled that sporting doesn’t include gambling services and thus should
be included in the U.S. commitments. While this problem could arise in any ser-
vices sector, e-commerce activities are particularly prone to interpretive ambiguities
due to the classiﬁcation difﬁculties mentioned earlier.
The second problem is confusion on modes of supply. Under the GATS, services
could be supplied in four modes: 1, cross-border supply, 2, consumption abroad, 3,
commercial presence, and 4, movement of natural persons. For e-commerce activi-
ties, it is quite difﬁcult to tell if a service is supplied throughMode 1 or 2 as the service
is provided in the cyberspace. Further complication could arise in cases where the
service supplier is located in anotherWTOMember, but maintains server in the home
country of the consumer. It could be argued that Mode 3 shall apply in such cases. As
a Member may have different levels of commitments depending on the mode of
supply, the confusion over mode of supply could lead to illogical consequences.
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To address these problems, the author makes two suggestions. First, the WTO
Members should agree on a set of scheduling guidelines for e-commerce activities.
This would help clarify the meaning of schedules and avoid future complications.
Second is the formulation of a set of regulatory principles that sets a minimum
regulatory standard for the e-commerce activities. In this regard, the
Telecommunications Reference Paper provides a really good model due to the close
links between the two sectors.
1.4 What About the Exception?
The general Exceptions clause allows a WTO Member to deviate from its normal
obligations. Under the GATS, the most frequently cited exception is the public
morals exception. Interestingly, in both of the two cases concerning Internet services,
i.e., the U.S.-Gambling case, an the China-Publications case, the respondent cited the
public morals exception to defend their measures. In their rulings, the WTO Panel
and Appellate Body often accord wide discretions to the national authorities in
deﬁning both the boundaries and depth of the exception, but this could lead to bizarre
results. For example, in the China-Publications case, the Appellate Body encouraged
the Chinese government to conduct censorship itself as it is supposedly better than
outsourcing to private ﬁrms from the perspective of WTO law.
In my view, it is problematic to accord wide discretions on the public morals
exception to countries without democratically-elected governments as such the
governments’ views on public morals are not necessarily truly aligned with those of
the people. A good way to prevent the potential abuse of the exception is to adopt
some universal benchmark on what may qualify as public morals, so that funda-
mental human rights, such as those enshrined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, will not be harmed under the disguise to protect public morals. As
the core competence of the WTO is in trade, it is ill-equipped with this task. Instead,
we should consider adopting a mechanism similar to the one under the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement, i.e., having the standards formulated by another
international organization with competence on public morals issue, and making it
mandatory for the WTO to consult them when disputes arise.
1.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, while the GATS, in its current form, is not well suited to the
regulation of e-commerce, it has the potential to keep up with the regulatory task.
However, to make this happen, we will need new approaches in dealing with
e-commerce activities, especially on key issues such as classiﬁcations, obligations
and exceptions.
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In this regard, the WTO might wish to learn from the approaches taken in the
various FTA, especially the ones negotiated by the US. As the world leader in
e-commerce, the US has a keen interest in pioneering the rules of internet regulation
and has been the de facto rule-maker in the ﬁeld. In the next part, we will examine
how the US FTAs treat the e-commerce issue.
2 Previous US FTAs
Since its FTA with Jordan in 2000, the US has included e-commerce chapters in
every FTA it has signed.6 These FTAs all follow largely the same model on
e-commerce, and the model is even spilled over to some of the FTAs signed by the
US FTA partner with other states.7
In general, the obligations in these FTAs can be divided into two categories:
ﬁrst, rules converted from existing obligations in the WTO; second, rules beyond
the existing WTO obligations.
2.1 Rules Based on Existing WTO Obligations
As e-commerce is a new ﬁeld, one of the concerns people had was whether the key
principles of the WTO would continue to apply to the digital frontier. This issue is
addressed in many US FTAs, which states that “[t]he Parties recognize … the
applicability of the WTO Agreement to measures affecting electronic commerce.”
While this language sounds reassuring, several caveats apply here. First, as the
language used here is “recognize”, one may argue that it does not create binding
obligations for FTA Parties to automatically apply all WTO rules to e-commerce.
Second, as a matter of fact, it might not be feasible or practical to apply WTO rules
automatically to measures affecting e-commerce. As mentioned earlier, the WTO
has different rules for goods and services. Given the controversy in the classiﬁcation
of e-commerce, it is hard to apply a set of uniform rules.
To solve this problem, the US FTAs have been taking a pragmatic approach on
e-commerce. First of all, they try to avoid the classiﬁcation issue by declining to
state explicitly whether e-commerce should be treated as goods or services. This
deliberate ambiguity allows them to pick and choose from both GATT and GATS
rules to cover any potential loopholes.
6For a list of the FTAs with e-commerce chapters, see the Annex. Note that e-commerce is
addressed in the Jordan FTA not as a chapter but a joint-statement.
7For an overview of the e-commerce chapters in pre-TPP US FTAs, see Sacha Wunsch-Vincent
and Arno Hold, ‘Towards Coherent Rules for Digital Trade: Building on Efforts in Multilateral
versus Preferential Trade Negotiations’, in Mira Burri and Thomas Cottier (eds) Trade
Governance in the Digital Age: World Trade Forum (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 193.
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For example, if e-commerce is classiﬁed as goods, it could be subject to customs
duties. The US FTAs address this issue by afﬁrming the moratorium on customs
duties established in the WTO Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce.
Moreover, these FTAs go a step further by ﬁlling in the gaps in the WTO rule. For
example, Article 16.3 of the US-Australia FTA states that “[n]either Party may
impose customs duties, fees, or other charges on or in connection with the
importation or exportation of digital products, regardless of whether they are ﬁxed
on a carrier medium or transmitted electronically.” This addresses the open ques-
tions left by the WTO E-commerce Declaration by making it clear that, ﬁrst, the
prohibition applies to other fees and charges in addition to customs duties; second,
it applies to both imports and exports; and third, it applies to the digital product
itself regardless of whether it is carried on a traditional medium or through elec-
tronic transmission. At the same time, recognizing the need for some countries to
collect customs duties on the carrier medium itself, the FTAs with Singapore and
Peru also explicitly state that “the customs value of an imported carrier medium
bearing a digital product” shall be determined “according to the cost or value of the
carrier medium alone, without regard to the cost or value of the digital product
stored on the carrier medium”. This approach has the advantage of lowering the
tariff burden of the higher-valued digital products or services, thus helping to
facilitate e-commerce in general.
On the other hand, for those e-commerce activities which could be classiﬁed as
trade in services, the US FTAs also afﬁrms the application of the relevant disci-
plines to “supply of a service delivered or performed electronically” by stating that
the obligations contained in the relevant FTA chapters (such as those on
cross-border trade in services, investment and ﬁnancial services) would be appli-
cable, to the extent that such obligations are not modiﬁed by any exceptions or
non-conforming measures enumerated in the FTAs.
After conﬁrming the application of the WTO rules in general, the FTAs go on to
incorporate several speciﬁc principles of the WTO. Of course, these rules have also
been modiﬁed as necessary to ﬁt the unique nature of e-commerce.
The ﬁrst is the non-discrimination principle. As one of the most fundamental
principles of the multilateral trading system, the non-discrimination principle plays
a key role in the WTO legal framework. The principle is reflected in two rules, i.e.,
the most-favored-nation rule, which prohibits discrimination among imported
products; and the national treatment rule, which prohibits discrimination against
imported products in favor of national products. All of the US FTAs incorporate the
non-discrimination principle. In many FTAs such as the Singapore and Korea
FTAs, it is combined with the moratorium on customs duty. In the Australia and
Chile FTAs, it is contained in a separate article.
Again, the principle has been tweaked here by mixing the approaches taken
under the GATT and GATS. First, both national treatment and most-favored nation
(MFN) treatment obligations are included. Second, both obligations apply on an
unconditional basis. This is more in line with the GATT approach and different
from the GATS approach, where a Member does not assume national treatment
obligation for a sector unless speciﬁc commitments has been scheduled. Third, the
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FTAs also provide that the two obligations doesn’t apply to non-conforming
measures adopted or maintained under the chapters on services and investment,
services subsidies, or services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority.
This feature is also modelled after the GATS, which allows Members to schedule
exemptions from MFN as well as national treatment obligations. Fourth, the FTAs
not only prohibit discrimination on the basis that “the digital products receiving less
favorable treatment are created, produced, published, stored, transmitted, contracted
for, commissioned, or ﬁrst made available on commercial terms in the territory of
the other Party”, but also in cases where “the author, performer, producer, devel-
oper, distributor, or owner of such digital products is a person of the other Party”. In
other words, the non-discrimination treatment applies not only to foreign products
as in the GATT, but also to foreign producers as in the GATS. Moreover, the
Australia and Singapore FTAs go a step further than even the GATS by prohibiting
discriminations against products or producers who are from non-parties.
The second is the transparency principle, which is contained in both Article X of
the GATT and Article III of the GATS. The US FTAs with several Latin American
and Middle-Eastern countries, for example, explicitly provides that the Parties
“shall publish or otherwise make publicly available its laws, regulations, and other
measures of general application that pertain to electronic commerce”.8 This pro-
vision probably results from the concern by the US in the lacking of transparency in
the general administrative and legal framework in these countries.
In addition to the application of general principles in the GATT and GATS, the
US FTAs have also incorporated the principles from the sector-speciﬁc agreements
and the latest WTO Agreements. The example for the former scenario is the pro-
vision on access to and use of internet for e-commerce, which states that:
“To support the development and growth of electronic commerce, each Party
recognizes that consumers in its territory should be able to:
(a) access and use services and digital products of their choice, unless prohibited
by the Party’s law;
(b) run applications and services of their choice, subject to the needs of law
Enforcement;
(c) connect their choice of devices to the Internet, provided that such devices do
not harm the network and are not prohibited by the Party’s law; and
(d) have the beneﬁt of competition among network providers, application and
service providers, and content providers.”
In a way, this provision is inspired by the existing disciplines under the Annex
on Telecommunications and Reference Paper, especially the provisions on access to
and use of public telecommunications transport networks and services and com-
petitive safeguards. Of course, the principles here are also modiﬁed to take into
account the different nature of e-commerce, and the coverage is expanded to include
not only the hardware infrastructure of the Internet but also the software
8See e.g., Article 15.4 of the Colombia FTA.
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environment. As the result, the beneﬁt has been extended to not only the network
providers but also the application providers, service providers and content
providers.
For the latter, a good example is the provision on paperless trading, which can be
found in the e-commerce chapters of almost all US FTAs. This article usually
includes two sub-sections. One states that the Parties “shall endeavor to accept trade
administration documents submitted electronically as the legal equivalent of the
paper version of those documents”. This is apparently modelled after Article 2.1 of
the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), which states that “[e]ach Member shall,
where appropriate, endeavour to accept paper or electronic copies of supporting
documents required for import, export, or transit formalities.” We can see that the
US FTA improves upon the TFA provision by ﬁrst, setting a preference for elec-
tronic submission, and second, recognizing the electronic versions as legally
equivalent to the paper versions. Under the other sub-section, each Party “shall
endeavor to make trade administration documents available to the public in elec-
tronic form”. Again, this can ﬁnd its origin in Article 1.1 of the TFA, which
requires WTO Members to review their formalities and documentation require-
ments in light of the technological developments and ensure they are “adopted and/
or applied in a manner that aims at reducing the time and cost of compliance for
traders and operators”.
Yet another interesting feature of the US FTAs is the conﬁrmation and application
of some of the hidden principles under theWTO framework. One such example is the
technology-neutrality principle, which holds that a service may be applied through
any means/technology available unless otherwise speciﬁed in a Member’s Schedule.
This principle has been recognized by the Council for Trade in Services in its Progress
Report to the General Council on the work programme on electronic commerce,9 and
conﬁrmed by the Panels in the U.S.-Gambling and China-Publications and
Audiovisual Products cases. However, this principle has not been formally incorpo-
rated into the WTO agreements. Nonetheless, the US FTAs have been applying the
principle by explicitly noting the following in the deﬁnition clauses:
carrier medium means any physical object capable of storing a digital product, by
any method now known or later developed,… including an optical medium, floppy
disk, and magnetic tape;
digital products means the digitally encoded form of computer programs, text,
video, images, sound recordings, and other products, regardless of whether they are
ﬁxed on a carrier medium or transmitted electronically;…
electronic transmission or transmitted electronically means the transfer of digital
products using any electromagnetic or photonic means.
Given the rapid development in the e-commerce sector, it is reassuring to have
the application of tech-neutrality principle spelled out so clearly and
comprehensively.
9S/L/74, 27 July 1999.
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2.2 WTO-Plus Obligations
In addition to incorporating the existing obligations in the WTO agreements, the US
FTAs have also included provisions on new issues, many of which dealing with
non-trade concerns. Some of these provisions can ﬁnd their origins from the general
exceptions clauses in the WTO agreements, while the others are drawn entirely
from the non-WTO agreements.
A good example in the ﬁrst category is clause for online consumer protection,
which states that “[t]he Parties recognize the importance of maintaining and adopting
transparent and effective measures to protect consumers from fraudulent and
deceptive commercial practices when they engage in electronic commerce.10” This
mirrors the language under Article XX.(d) of the GATT and Article XIV.(c).(i) of the
GATS, which allows members to maintain measures necessary to secure compliance
with laws or regulation for “prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices”. Given
the anonymous nature of cyberspace, most e-commerce transactions are conducted
without physical contact between the parties. Thus, it is necessary to have in place
measures to protect consumers from fraudulent and deceptive commercial practices.
Another example is the clause on Cross Border Information Flows, which states
that the Parties “shall endeavor to refrain from imposing or maintaining unneces-
sary barriers to electronic information flows across borders”.11 One may argue that
the clause is encompassed by the prohibition of “disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade” under the GATT and GATS exceptions clauses, but again it comes
with a different twist here. First of all, the language “electronic information flows
across borders” is broad enough to cover even non-trade related information flows.
Second, as the clause only applies to “cross-border” barriers, one may argue that
domestic restrictions on data flows could be allowed. However, given the
wide-spread use of offshore servers and border-less nature of the cyberspace, even
domestic regulations could potentially have cross-border implications. Third, the
clause also leaves some flexibility to regulators by implicitly allowing “necessary”
barriers to cross-border, but the question of whether the necessity requirement is a
subjective or objective one is left open. In any event, as this provision is couched in
best-endeavor language, it might not have major implications for the FTA Parties.
On the other hand, the provisions on electronic authentication and electronic
signatures are entirely new in the world of trade agreements. These provisions require
the FTA Parties to leave it to the parties to an electronic transaction to mutually
determine the appropriate authentication methods for the transaction, or at least be
given the opportunity to prove in court that their electronic transaction complies with
any legal requirements with respect to authentication. They solve a big problem in
e-commerce, which due to its very nature often have difﬁculty meeting the
requirements under traditional contract laws. As these issues deal mainly with the
contracts between private parties, the WTO has never ventured into these areas.
10KORUS, Article 15.5.
11KORUS, Article 15.8.
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Instead, the FTAs draw their inspiration from the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Electronic Commerce12 (1996) and Model Law on Electronic Signatures (2001).13
Given the widespread adoption of the twoModel Laws by the major economies in the
world,14 the US FTAs set good examples by including a clause on electronic
authentication and electronic signatures. In the long run, these clauses could help
pave the way for the harmonization of international rules on these issues.
3 The TPP
Since the beginning of the negotiations, the TPP has been touted as a
“high-standard”, “21st Century” trade agreement. As such, it is no surprise that
e-commerce features prominently in its agenda. In the Nov 2011 Outline for the
TPP, the TPP Members agreed that the e-commerce text shall “enhance the viability
of the digital economy”. To achieve this goal, the Members resolved to ensure that
“impediments to both consumer and businesses embracing this medium of trade are
addressed”.
In June 2014, the USTR further elaborated the U.S. objectives in the TPP,
including the following on e-commerce and telecom:
– “commitments not to impose customs duties on digital products (e.g., software,
music, video, e-books);
– non-discriminatory treatment of digital products transmitted electronically and
guarantees that these products will not face government-sanctioned discrimi-
nation based on the nationality or territory in which the product is produced;
– requirements that support a single, global Internet, including ensuring
cross-border data flows, consistent with governments’ legitimate interest in
regulating for purposes of privacy protection;
– rules against localization requirements that force businesses to place computer
infrastructure in each market in which they seek to operate;
– commitments to provide reasonable network access for telecommunications
suppliers through interconnection and access to physical facilities;
– provisions promoting choice of technology and competitive alternatives to
address the high cost of international mobile roaming”.
In the ﬁnal Agreement, the TPP devoted an entire chapter to e-commerce. In
contrast, many contemporary FTAs concluded by other WTO Members, especially
developing countries, either fail to address e-commerce issues at all or simply
mention the issue in one or two articles. One may argue that such approach simply
12Articles 5–8, 11.
13Articles 3 & 6.
14The Model Law on Electronic Commerce has been adopted by 66 States including the US while
the Model Law on Electronic Signatures has been adopted by 32 states.
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follows the established practice of the US, which has included e-commerce chapters
in every FTA it has concluded in the new century. However, if we take a closer
look, we can see that the e-commerce chapter in the TPP exceeds the preceding
FTAs in both breadth and depth. For example, the most comprehensive e-commerce
chapter before the TPP was contained in the US-Korea FTA. It includes 9 articles
and covers the following issues: electronic supply of services, digital products
(which include moratorium on customs duties and non-discriminatory treatments),
electronic authentication and electronic signatures, online consumer protection,
paperless trading, access to and use of internet for e-commerce, and cross-border
information flows. In contrast, the TPP includes a total of 18 articles and address
additional issues such as domestic electronic transactions framework, personal
information protection, Internet interconnection charge sharing, localisation of
computing facilities, unsolicited commercial electronic messages, cooperation,
source code and dispute settlement. In summary, while the TPP e-commerce text
includes the key elements of the traditional US template, it also includes new
features which reflect new directions in the US policy. On the other hand, as the
TPP is a regional initiative that involve more parties than the traditional bilateral US
FTAs, the US also have to make compromises in the TPP in response to the
bargaining pressures from the other parties. As the result, while the TPP
e-commerce chapter was able to make progress on some new issues, it has retracted
from the earlier US FTAs on some other issues.
3.1 New Progresses Made
While many of the issues addressed in the TPP are new to the multilateral trading
system, the regulatory approach still largely follows the traditional WTO model by
focusing on the regulators. At the same time, the TPP has also taken note of the
problems created by the unique nature of Digital Trade and formulated rules
accordingly.
Many of these are couched in the “thou shalt not” language familiar to trade
lawyers. For example, under Article 14.13, TPP Members shall not require a
covered person to use or locate computing facilities such as servers and storage
facilities in the host country’s territory as a condition for conducting business in that
territory. In a way, this provision resembles the prohibition of local content
requirements found under the TRIMs agreement.
Similarly, under Article 14.17, a TPP Member may not require the transfer of, or
access to, source code of software owned by a person of another Party, as a
condition for the import, distribution, sale or use of such software, or of products
containing such software, in its territory. But the prohibition applies only to
mass-market software or products containing such software, which implies that
softwares tailor-made for speciﬁc clients/projects are excluded. The same article
further excludes software used for critical infrastructure and those in commercially
negotiated contracts, and allows Parties to require the modiﬁcation of source code
358 H. Gao
to ensure compliance with its FTA-consistent laws or regulations, and the provision
of source code for patent applications.
Some other articles take a step further by requiring the TPP parties to make
positive efforts and put in place certain laws and regulations. For example, in
addition to the provision on the recognition of validity of electronic authentication
methods and electronic signatures, TPP Members are also required to maintain a
legal framework governing electronic transactions consistent with the principles of
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996) or the United Nations
Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts
(2005).15 Another two articles require the Parties to adopt or maintain the necessary
legal framework for online consumer protection and personal information protec-
tion respectively.16
In contrast, with respect to some of the other issues, the TPP takes an entirely
new approach by shifting the regulatory focus to business ﬁrms. The most obvious
example is the provision on unsolicited commercial electronic messages, which
requires the suppliers of such information to either obtain the consent from the
recipient, or at least allow the recipient to choose not to receive such information. If
the suppliers fail to comply, the recipient shall have recourse again them. Similarly,
the burden of meeting the requirements for personal information protection also
rests largely with private ﬁrms. Indeed, the TPP explicitly allows the Members to
meet the obligation for personal information protection by not having mandatory
laws on the substantive obligations, but just relying on the enforcement of voluntary
undertakings by enterprises relating to privacy.
Another two new provisions under the TPP deal with cyber-security cooperation
and internet connection charge sharing. However, as they use best-endeavor lan-
guages, they might have only limited impacts.
3.2 Where the TPP is Falling Short
First, the overall scope of the TPP is narrower. The narrower scope is mainly deﬁned
by limiting the type of actors that conduct the activity or hold or process the infor-
mation. For example, under Article 14.2, the TPP has explicitly carved out gov-
ernment procurement and information held or processed by or on behalf of a Party, or
measures related to such information, including measures related to its collection.
With this carve-out, the TPP countries could require that government data be stored
and processed only on domestic computing facilities, or require suppliers in gov-
ernment procurement projects to transfer the source code to the government. One
might think that this carve-out mainly respond to concerns from the lesser developed
TPP countries, but as the Edward Snowden Affair has illustrated, even a most
15Article 14.5.
16Article 14.7 & 14.8.
20 The Regulation of Digital Trade in the TPP … 359
advanced and open economy like the US might share the reluctance to subject its
government to the highly demanding requirements under the TPP. Similarly, Article
14.1 excludes “ﬁnancial institution” and “cross-border ﬁnancial service supplier of a
Party” from the scope of “covered person” under the e-commerce chapter. This
probably reflects the consensus among the TPPMembers to strengthen the regulation
of ﬁnancial sector in the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis.
Second, the scope of the non-discrimination obligation has shrunk as well. To
start with, all previous FTAs covers digital products which “are created, produced,
published, stored, transmitted, contracted for, commissioned, or ﬁrst made available
on commercial terms” in another FTA party. The TPP, however, removes “stored”
from the list and denies non-discrimination to non-TPP originating digital products
that are stored in servers in TPP countries. Similarly, by removing the category
“distributor” from the previous FTA list of “the author, performer, producer,
developer, or distributor of such digital products is a person of the other Party”, the
TPP essentially allows Members to deny non-discriminatory treatment to popular
app distributors such as Google Play store and Apple App store, both of which sell
many apps developed by non-TPP nationals. Also, while some earlier FTAs such as
the ones with Australia and Singapore extend the non-discrimination beneﬁts to
digital products from non-FTA parties, the most recent Korea FTA has retracted by
reserving the beneﬁts only to FTA parties. This less-liberal approach is followed by
the TPP. To sum up, under the TPP, the beneﬁt of non-discrimination seems to be
reserved only for those with direct roles to play in shaping the content of the
products, rather than just provide storage or distribution services for the product.
Third, with regard to the provision on cross-border information flow, while the
TPP has strengthened the obligation by changing the language from the best
endeavor language in the KORUS FTA to a legally binding “shall”, it has also
taken a backward step by limiting the scope from all information to only such
information transfer that is “for the conduct of the business of a covered person”.
This limitation is reportedly added to address concerns by countries like Australia
and New Zealand,17 but it could raise several problems. First, as the deﬁnition of
covered person only includes covered investment, investor or service supplier, other
parties can not beneﬁt from this provision. In other words, if a Member choose not
to open up a sector to other TPP Parties, it can restrict information flow in the
sector. Second, even for covered persons, they can only claim the beneﬁt for those
activities “for the conduct of the business”. If interpreted narrowly, one can argue
that even pre-sale promotional activities might not be covered here. Third, as the
word used here is “for the conduct of the business”, it could be argued that only
for-proﬁt activities count as “business” activities and not-for-proﬁt activities such as
free search engine service, free social media and free news service etc. are not
covered as they do not qualify as proper “business”. Thus, the blocking of Google,
Facebook and open-access newspapers by certain countries might be perfectly legal
under this provision.
17TPP Countries to Discuss Australian Alternative to Data-Flow Proposal, Inside US Trade (2012).
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4 Concluding Thoughts
As we can see from our earlier discussions, while the TPP is not the ﬁrst US FTA to
include an e-commerce chapter, it has many interesting features, and they reflect the
major shift in both regulatory philosophy and approach in the new era of US FTAs.
In terms of the overall regulatory philosophy, the earlier US FTAs tend to focus
mostly on the “trade” aspects by trying to ﬁt e-commerce into the existing
framework of the WTO and borrowing heavily from the WTO rulebooks, while the
TPP has started to recognize the unique nature of e-commerce and tried to formulate
new rules beﬁtting the “digital” nature of e-commerce. Such efforts are most evident
in rules relating to issues such as transfer of source code and forced localization
requirements, which are new issues created by the amorphous and border-less
nature of digital trade.
Of course, it would be unfair to say that the earlier FTAs have made no headway
into the “digital” regulation aspects. For example, by explicitly stating that digital
products encompass both goods and services, the earlier US FTAs avoid the trap set
by the compartmentalization between the GATT and the GATS and made a small
but important step into the formulation of a coherent approach on digital trade.
Nonetheless, due to their inherent myopia on the nature of digital trade, the
earlier US FTAs just blindly followed the regulatory approach under the WTO by
focusing on the regulation of national governments, even though, ironically, one
might argue that digital trade was able to develop so quickly largely because there
was little or no governmental regulation. Perhaps in recognition of this, the TPP has
taken a different approach by shifting the regulatory burden to private ﬁrms, as they
are the really the ones who have created the digital frontier. With the massive
information they have in control, private ﬁrms such as Google and Facebook are
more powerful than most governments and the TPP has done the right thing by
including them in the regulatory matrix.
As the ﬁrst-ever FTA negotiated by the Obama Administration, the TPP reflects
the new priorities and approaches taken in US trade negotiations for future FTAs, as
well as other negotiating fora. For example, those who are familiar with the
negotiations under the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) can ﬁnd many simi-
larities between the TPP provisions and the US proposals on e-commerce in the
TiSA. At the same time, given the large and diverse membership of the TPP, the US
did not always get what it wanted but occasionally had to settle with compromises
in the TPP. In other words, the TPP tells us not only what the US wants, but also
what the US is likely to get in a pluri-lateral or even multilateral deal under the
bargaining pressures from the other parties. Thus, understanding the e-commerce
chapter in the TPP is important not only for the current TPP Members, but also for
the other countries, as they will very likely have to face similar rules under the TiSA
or even the WTO one day.
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Annex: List of Pre-TPP US FTAs with E-commerce
Chapters
• Australia: Australia—United States Free Trade Agreement (2004)
• Chile: Chile—United States Free Trade Agreement (2004)
• Singapore: Singapore—United States Free Trade Agreement (2004)
• Bahrain: Bahrain—United States Free Trade Agreement (2006)
• Morocco: Morocco—United States Free Trade Agreement (2006)
• Oman: Oman—United States Free Trade Agreement (2006)
• Peru: Peru—United States Trade Promotion Agreement (2007)
• Dominican Republic—Central America FTA (2005)
• Panama: Panama—United States Trade Promotion Agreement (2012)
• Colombia: United States—Colombia Free Trade Agreement (2012)
• South Korea: United States—Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement (2012)
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